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not move on; connected to a local sense of what it means to
live in our city. Grand Rapids, I believe, has prided itself on
being a place in which local loyalties could be honored and
extended, local institutions could be continued or reinvented,
and a sense of community could be preserved and built upon.
To an unusual extent, Grand Rapids has relied on a technolo
gy that has evolved locally. It does not seem coincidental that
it is one of the relatively few metropolitan areas in the
Midwest where the manufacturing sector continues to grow.
There are nonetheless important threats to these historic suc
cesses: the ghettoization of a substantial part of the inner city;
the atrophy of downtown retail business; the suburbanization,
first of homes, then of retail business, and increasingly of
industry; the failure of any scheme of metropolitan governance
to take hold and a consequent increasing impoverishment of
the old city; and substantial crime rates.
On this last point, it is worth noting that Fortune magazine's
recent rating of American cities for positive business climate
listed Charlotte, North Carolina as number one and Nashville,
Tennessee as number two. They have been two of the most
rapidly growing metropolitan areas in the country, heavily
reliant on external capital. They also had among the highest
crime rates in the country--higher than Cleveland or Dayton or
Pittsburgh and almost twice as high as Grand Rapids.
charlotte has an infant death rate thirty percent higher than
Grand Rapids. Grand Rapids people are more likely to
belong to and use our public libraries. We are more likely to
read The Press than Charlotte people are The Observer, or
Nashville people, The Tenneseean. These are all indices of
community involvement. Fortune did not count them in their
ratings but they are not things we want to lose.
The trick, Iexpect, is to encourage growth which sustains
community. Ithink that is the only kind of sustainable growth-
that we do not need the sort of growth that Flint had a half cen
tury ago--growth which the congressional report Ialluded to
earlier prophetically suggested was producing a civic vacuum.

eral, state, and school districts are excluded, the local govern
ments remaining total 72,136. In 1942, the comparable
number of government units providing local, non-educational
services was 46,488. That amounts to a 55% increase over
the past half century.
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Within the metropolitan areas of our nation where 79% of
the population lives, !compared to 63% in 1960}, the number
of local governments has nearly doubled in 30 years: 18,442
in 1962 to 33,004 in 1992, again excluding school districts.
(Census of Government, 1992) .
Why is this significant? Why should this growth in the num
ber of units of local government matter to the residents and
businesses of metro areas such as Grand Rapids? Besides the
already noted statistics regarding the growing number of citi
zens living in metropolitan areas and the increasing number
of local government units, there are other important social,
economic, and governance reasons why such concern is mer
ited. Among them are:
1.} Inner-city problems relating to poverty, substandard
housing, crime, and racial segregation are prevalent in metro
politan areas. Local government is often called upon to deal
with these serious issues which impact living conditions
throughout each community (Rusk, 1993).

2.) Financial inequities, or the unequal ability to generate
revenues, are evident among the units of local government in
metropolitan areas (AClR, 1987).
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3.) A large number of special purpose districts have been
formed which can add to the complexity of service delivery
(Wright, 1988). There are 13,614 existing districts in metro
politan areas of the U.S. (Census of Governments, 1992).
4.) Fragmentation (multiple units of government) and
sprawl (suburban growth) are issues of major concern to land
use planners (ACIR - Allegheny County, 1992).

5.) Only 16 city-county mergers have occurred in the
United States since World War II, and most efforts to consoli
date local units of government have been rejected by voters
(Peirce, 1991 J.
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"Confusion now hath made his masterpiece."
- Shakespeare
Confusion and complexity are terms descriptive of the maze
of units of local government in the United States. In 1992
there were 86,743 units of government in the U.S. When fed

6.) There is no generally accepted system of metropolitan
government which has been agreed upon either by political
theorists or by public administration professionals. The range
of theory is from the views of the consolidationists to those
A
who ascribe to the competitive model, called poly-centrists
•
(AClR, St. Louis, 1988, Zimmerman, 1991 J.
Of these several concerns, perhaps the most important is
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the growing evidence that fragmentation and sprawl contribute
to the racial separation and economic inequities that character
ize many urban communities. There is concern that the level of
•
rest is of crisis proportions (Rusk, 1993, Peirce, 1993).
Yet despite such serious concern, liFe goes on in the cities,
suburbs, townships, and special districts of our nation's metro
areas. Governing happens and services get delivered.
Utilities, fire and police protection are provided. Streets and
highways are built and maintained. While one can certainly
produce ample evidence of problems, inefficiencies, inequities
and even crisis in our metropolitan regions, nevertheless,
things do work. Commerce gets transacted and people get to
work; they go to school, to parks and to shopping areas.
Society functions in metro areas, not perfecrly, but overall, we
do get along.
Given the maze of complexity that describes local govern
ment in the U.S., how does it manage to Function? A major
reason is voluntary cooperation. Even though one can point
to very few examples of metropolitan government, there is
identifiable, if often informal, governance. This was demon
strated in the ACiR's St. Louis County (1988) and Allegheny
County (1992) case studies. A similar situation can be
demonstrated through examination of Grand Rapids metro
area intergovernmental activity.

e

So, if voluntary cooperation is the primary means by which
we must seek to improve the governance of growing metro
areas such as Grand Rapids, it becomes critical to understand
the factors which encourage and inhibit such cooperation.
Study of the political and public administration literature on
this topic reveals that the most significant factors are:

1.) Political conditions, which can include a brood range of
factors such as partisan preferences, voting behavior citizen
group activism, interest groups and dominant political philosophy.

6.) Legal constraints or inducements such as laws promul
gated by the state, local government personnel rules, or ordi
nances within the units of government.
Research done in recent months by the author identified
factors felt to be significant in Grand Rapids metro. Interviews
were conducted with twenty-one key informants, individuals
fram both private and public sectors who have been long time
participant-observers in metro activities. The factors which
inhibit or encourage cooperation among local units of govern
ment in Grand Rapids metro are displayed on the accompa
nying charts.
FIGURES
MAJOR FACTORS INHlBlTI!"G INTERLOCAL GOVER!"MENT COOPERATION
Grand Rapids Merropolil(J1I K(\' Informants
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Parochialism, community autonomy and turf protection fac
tors were noted most often as inhibiting. At nearly the same
level were factors relating to politics, personalities and power.
What was discerned from these leaders was that in Grand
Rapids, Michigan, the desire to protect one's community turF
and the autonomy and independence which led to the estab
lishment of many of these communities is a very strong feeling.
When this is combined with strong and independent personal
ities as well as a long-standing conservative political ethic, it
presents a scenario which is a major inhibiting factor for inter
local cooperation.

2.) Economic factors which include tax beneFits, access to
favorable zoning and public infrastructure For development,
employment opportunity, capital cost avoidance, and opera
tional costs For public services such as utilities and public safety.

3.) Sociological factors such as poverty, educational levels,
race and ethnic barriers, or religious identiFication.

PIGURE6
MAJOR FACTORS ENCOURAGING INTERLOCAL GOVERr-iMENT COOPERATION
Grand Rapid!! Metropolitan Key lnjorman(.t

Factors Encouraging

4.) Geographic Factors related to natural boundaries such
as rivers and mountains, land uses, environmental concerns,
eSOil conditions, and climate.
to
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Historic rivalries or traditions such as old land or politi
cal disputes or even business competitive history.
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It is not surprising that factors relating to cost efficiencies
and avoidance of duplication were rated as the strongest fac
tors encouraging cooperation by the key informants. This is
consistent with the conservative ethic of Grand Rapids metro
communities. A 1O-year examination of expenditure patterns
of metro communities in Grand Rapids found that per capita
spending by local governments in Grand Rapids metro is col
lectively less than 2/3 of the national average.
All this leads to the subject of leadership. Looking at the
charts, one notes that when the two leadership factors are
added together, all but one key informant cited leadership, or
lack of it, as a major factor. Clearly, the need for metropolI
tan leadership is a major factor in promoting further coopera
tion among units of local government in Grand Rapids metro.
Two significant points need to be made in conclusion. First,
the findings in Grand Rapids [and to a significant extent in
other communities) make it clear that the leadership push for
more inter-local cooperation will need to come from business
leaders. Second, it is evident from the research that there is no
formula or theory of metropolitan governance which can be
generalized to all metro areas. Each is unique. While much
can be learned from the experiences of other communities, the
mix of factors which inhibit or encourage cooperation differs in
each metropolitan area. Each must address inter-local coopera
tion for the delivery of public services in its own way, after
thoughtful Introspection and as part of strategic planning for the
future of the metro region.
Note: This article is extracted from the author's doctoral
research in progress, scheduled for completion in Spring, 1996.
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Bank Consolidation
Professor Dave Hutchison, Finance Department,
Seidman School of Business, Grand Valley State Univ.
Merger mania has hit the banking industry! Virtually, every
day we hear of another "mega-merger" between banks in the
works. Indeed, the pace at which banking organizations have
joined forces has been feverish over the last couple of years.
Through the third quarter of 1995 alone, nearly 300 bank
mergers deals valued at nearly $40 billion had been
announced, with little end in sight in the immediate future.
While industry consolidation is hardly new, the scope and
nature of the participants in this latest round is unprecedented.
We've seen the alliance of titans created by the union of
Chemical Bank and Chase Manhattan, a deal valued at $10
billion, and the joining of "super regionals" such as First
Union's $5.1 billion buyout of First Fidelity and, a little closer
to home, the $5.3 billion merger of NBD and First National of
Chicago.
As of the end of last year, the 2 largest American Banks 
(measured by assets), BankAmerica and NationsBank were
engaged in merger discussions that if consummated would
create a bank with $410 billion in assets and 7% of all
bank deposits nationwide. If these monoliths are ripe for
consolidation, then just about any banking organization
could be vulnerable.

Legislation
Under the McFadden Act of 1927, legal authority over
bank branching for both state and national banks was given
to the states. The original purpose of the Act was to place
national banks on an equal footing with states with respect
to geographic market access. In effect, the McFadden Act
eliminated interstate banking. For the better part of 50
years, states legislatures, which essentially controlled geo
graphic restrictions on banking activities, avoided taking
actions that would have allowed natural interstate competi
tion among banks.
1975 marked the beginning of a change in attitude on the
part of state governments toward interstate banking. In this
year the state of Maine passed the first "reciprocity" law
•
granting branching authority to banks headquartered in other
states as long as these states provided reciprocity for banks
headquartered in Maine. Similar arrangements were slow to
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